üRF
Fingerprints and a cryptographic identity are bound together in a credential
üSigner
identities captured as part of credential issuing process
üParallelism
possible here; multiple credentials could be created in the final round of the
protocol
üRF
Fingerprint values are averaged using measurements made over multiple distinct noisy channels
üAdversary
must be a member of a group to learn RF Fingerprint values and then share them.
üNo
advantage, since the adversary must be close enough to measure RF Fingerprint
values directly.
ûCan NOT stop
attackers from colluding
üIf detected,
CAN identify them (and their collusion activities) using
their RF Fingerprints
ûCertain
topologies (i.e. sparse ones) do not have some of these benefits
ûIndeed,
certain cases where credentials cannot be produced (i.e. non fully-connected subnetworks or honest node minority situations)